Harold C. Fuller v. First Security Bank of Utah : Brief of Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1959
Harold C. Fuller v. First Security Bank of Utah :
Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Karl V. King; Attorney for Defendant and Appellant;
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Fuller v. First Security Bank of Utah, No. 9086 (Utah Supreme Court, 1959).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/3396
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
FILE 0 
HAROLD C. FULLER~ 
Plaintiff and ~-~~~~-~~ifi~- ·-··c~;;t,·-ut~h--. 
VS~ 
FIRST SECURITY BANK OF UTAH, N. A.~ 
EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF FAE 
L. FULLER, deceased, 
Defendant and Appellant~ 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
KARL V. KING 
No. 
9086 
Attorney for Defendant 
and Appellant 
=========mr==Y~~--~==========~-~~~~--~·ti_ .. ~ .... 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
INDEX 
Page 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ___________________________________________________ :.-__ 1 
PRETRIAL ORDER r~~-~---~- --· . • •-- ••~~-~•-••~-•u~--~~-•~•••••~~~-·~-~~~~~-~~•••-••-••••• 2 
(a) PLAINT IF F~S CONTE f\'TIONS --~r-~-----~-----------------'~-~----~----- 2 
(b) DE FEND ANT j S CO NTENTI 0 NS ____ _ ___ _ ___ _ ___ ____ _ ___ _ ___ _ ____ _ ___ _ 3 
STATEMENT 0 F FACTS ........... r •••••••••••••••••• ·-·. -~-. --~ •• -~. ~ ·- ~ •••• ___ y __ 3 
STATEi\·'1 ENT OF APPELLANT'S POINTS -~-~-~---~~-~-~--r-~~-~--- 21-22 \. 
ARGUMENT: 
POINT I: It is the position of the defendant and appellant that 
there was a good and valid delivery of the ·deed to the B 
Street property. This is based upon the fa~ts which demon-
strate his intent at the time of the delivery of the deed tq 
transfer title to his wife in order to provide her~ Fae L~ 
Fuller, with a permanent income and as a part o£ temporary 
alimony pending the divorce. His acts and statements indicate 
this until the point when~ under the advise of his attorney~ 
he r:ha.nged his position b~t then it was too late as a rna tter 
of Ia w. . ..... ~~. ·-· ... ~ ~ ~. ~ r _ --- __ -- _ --- _ -- __ -- _ ---. ~ ~. _ --- _ ------ _ ---------- _ --- _ -~- _ -~-. ___ 2 3 
POINT II: That the findings of fact and conclusions of law 
made aod entered by the court are not supported by the 
evidence and that the court should have signed the findings 
of fact, conclusions of Ia w and judgment submitted by the 
de£ endant as they are supported by the evidence. The court 
should have sustained defendant's objections to plalntiff~s 
findings of fact~ conclusions of 1 aw and j udgtnent·--------~-~- 34 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Page 
POINT I I I : That a new trial should have been granted and 
defendant afforded an opportunity to introduce new 1 y dis-
covered evidence which was material and suppo.rted the 
position of defendant~ which evidence was not discovered 
until after the trial. Though defendant exercised diligence, 
he was unable to locate the witnesses prior to the triaL______ 3 7 
POINTS IV AKD V: The court erred in sustaining an objec-
tion to the ad mission of the F ae L. Fuller: will. The coutt 
erred in. sustaining an objection to the admission of the 
inventory in the F ae L. Fuller estate. _______________ -~ ___ r~ •. -&~~-~-_ __ _ _ 3 8 
CON CL USI ON .. ~~ -&~. ~-_ -~ ~ ________________ ------ ----~-- -- -~~ ~- .. r~ ••• ~~ .&. ____ -~---- __ ___ _ 39 
TABLE OF CASES CITED 
Gappmayer v. Wilkenson~ 53 Utah 236~ 177 P. 763 ~--~·r··------------ 29' 
In re Hume"s Estate, 2 72 P. 2d 999 r•~r··· ·~· -~--~~----u~-~------------------------ 32 
Johnson v. Cameron ( N ~ C. ) , 48 SE 640 ~ _ -~ ___ _________ ___ __ __ _______ ______ _ 3 9 
Lavely v. Nonemaker (CaL) 298 P. 976 ----------·---~-~-~-------------- 30t 32 
Losee v ~ J~nes, 120 Utah 38 5, 23 5 P. 2d 132 ----------------------~~----·~ 34 
Mower v. Mower~ 64 LTtah 260, 228 P. 911 ~-----~~-~~------------~~~~--~~- 34 
Nor by' v ~ ~ister (CaL )"t 2 50 P. 2d 633 -------------------------------------------~ )2 
. . 
Reed v. Knudson, 80 Utah 428 11 1 5 P. 2d 34 7 --~~-------~-------------------· 34 
Stanley v. Stanley, 97 Utah 520, 94 P. 2d 465 ~---~~-----•a--~u~·-~-~P~---- 34 
Williams v. Reich (CaL)~ 10 P. 2d 1030 -------------------------~~~-·-~~--·~-- 33 
Wilson v. Wilson~ 32 Utah 169, 89 P~ 643 ~~-r-~--~·~~- ---~-----------------·· 29 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
. ' }f . . . 
· of .the ~~ 
·stATE·, OF ·uTAH 
HAROLD C. FULLER~ 
)' .-: 
Plaintiff and RespondenJj 
vs. 
FIRST SEClJRITY BANK OF UTAH~ N. A., 
EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF FAE 
L. FULLER~ deceased~· 
Defendant and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 







This is an appeal from the Findings of. Fact~. Cqnclusions qf 
Law and Judgment and the ov~rruling of de£~nd~-~fs ¥oti~~- ~~? 
.1 New Trial by the Honorable Ray \'anCott Jr.t one("of the judges 
of the District Court of Salt Lake County. This is a suit in equity 
to set aside a deed and quiet title in plaintiff. The issues ~·ere joined 
as shown by the Pretrial Order as follows: 
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PRETRIAL ORDER 
After a discussion bern: e en the Court and counsel, the con~ 
ten tio n s of the parties are stated as I allows: 
PLAINTJ FFjS CONTENTIONS: 
1. The plain tiff contends that ·the pla.in tiff and the deceased~ 
F ae L. Fuller, vle re husband and ..,. .. j £ e prior to her death on a pproxi~ 
mately the 29th day of September, 1958+ 
2. That marital cliff icu l ties had led them to consider the pos-
sibility of a divorce. Negotiations had been entered into through 
the attorney of fae L. Fuller] Frank .F.. Moss, and as part of the 
negotiations it was con tern p J a ted that there wou I d be a d xvislon 
of the pro pc rty ot the parties. The property consisted of the fo 11 ow-
ing as far as this case is concerned: two apartment housesJ one 
located on B Street and one on 2nd South Street in Salt Lake City) 
{Jtah. 
Plaintiff con tends that he w .as to deed to the said F ae L. Fuller 
the apartment house on B Street 
3. The plaintiff visited the office of Frank E. Moss to read and 
consider the divon:c papers that had been prepared by him as 
attorney for Fae L. Fuller. At that time he .signed the deed conveying 
the property at 105 B Street t~ Fae L. Fu]ler and leaving it with 
Frank r:. Moss. 
4. It is the contention of the plaintiff that the signing and 
deliver"'' of the deed to Frank E~ Moss \VJ.S conditionaL to·wit: 
J • 
The transfer was not to be completed until a divorce had been 
obtained. 
5. Prior to the time of any divorce being obtained, the said 
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l ae L. Fuller died. The plaintiff, therefore, claims that the deed 
may be withdrawn and the Court should order the reconveyance 
of the property from the deceas ~d through her administrator to the 
plaintiff. 
DEFENDAN1~'S CON1"El\i'fiONS: 
L Defendant contends that Fae L. Fuller at the time of her 
death \\'JS in possession of property and was managing and operating 
t llat a pa rtm en t hou.se. 
2. That it was an unconditional~ good and valid delivery of the 
deed to Fae L. Fuller. 
The plea dings are merged in the pretrial order and the is sues 
will be as framed •,.herein, and without furtber amendment unless 
written objections are filed \vithin five days from the date of this 
order. 
The case is set for non.jury trial, March 24)· 1959 at ten. o'clock 
A.!vl. 
Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 19th day of March, 1959. 
ALDON J. ANDERSON 
District Judge 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Appellant herewith submits a condensation of the material 
evidence, tending to support the position of the respective parties. 
The evidence will be given in the order in which it occurs jn the 
transcript and as in trod uc ed at the c rial. 
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The first witness called was the plaintiff~ HAROLD(_ FULLER~ 
who testifi. ed on direct examlna tion that the First Security Bank 
is the ad minis t ra tor of the estate of his w lf e, F ae L. Fuller. That 
in the summer of 195 7 he had occasion to visit the office of Frank 
E~ Moss, an attorney in SaJt Lake Gty, in respect to the property 
involved in this law suit. That Frank E. Moss had been his attorney 
for several years. ·"My wife and I had talked over a divorce and 
she had gone to see Mr. Mo.ss and we .figured out what she wanted 
in the ~vay of money and the property on B Street, she wanted tbe 
property and so much a week on the divorce deal.'~ (Record 9) 
Mr. Fu Her then testified that Mr. Moss called him and he went 
to his office and they talked over the divorce. 
(Record 10) 
13 ~ "Q. That ~vas. the summer of. 195 7? 
14 A. Yes. And then ~ve made a divorce settlement and I 
15 agreed to the property deal~ but not the weekly amoupt) and 
16 1 didn~t sign the papers at that time on account of we hadn't 
17 ~~orked it out.j' 
Mr. Fuller then testified that he paid MrT Moss as hi.s attorney 
and that prj or to this time he had never been Mrs. Fuller~ s a ttomey. 
(Record 10) . That Mr. Moss Vlas the only 1 avlyer involved. 
(Record 11) 
20 t~ A_ He v./anted me to give her the B Street property and 
21 so much a week and I was agreeable to the B Street property 
22 but I \va sn·t agreeable to setting an amOWlt on a weekly deal 
2 3 because I didn · t know what I would make. I agreed to give 
z .. i her whatever I could give her and that was \vhy 1 didn't siS!n 
25 the papers at that time+" 
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At the time of the discuss ion the property was held in joint tenancy. 
(Record ll) ~ That documents were prepared and ~r Fuller saw 
these documents in Judge Mosst office .at his desk. 
(Record 12) 
11 14Q, Now did you execute a deed at that time to the B Street 
12 property ? 
13- A. Ko. It 'vas later} after I talked to Fa.e~ considerable 
1-l after that~ tt ying to get her to release this definite amount 
15 per week that she wanted so that v.re could leave it open so I 
16 could give her whatever l could make or borrow, whatever the 
17 case would Ge. because our business was in bad shape at the 
18 time.t~ 
20 nA. Later on we got together.~, 
(Record 13) 
8 nQ. Now did you sign any document at that time? 
9 A. I signed when lvirs. Fuller and I got together on this. 
10 She finally reached a point where she \Vas going to go through 
11 and trust me to pay her what I could and I went up and signed 
12 this deed with Mr~ Moss. 
13 Q~ Now did you see other documents at the time you sig~ed 
l··l the deed in Mr. Moss' office? 
IS A. I\o. I seen those before and I just suppose it was the 
16 same setup there and they would have to be changed, the 
17 amount had not been changed on there and Mrs. Fuller and I 
18 agreed to 1 t. ~' 
1-Ir. Moss \vas not present at the time Mr. Fuller signed the deed. 
That he 1 eft tb e deed with Mr. Moss~ secretary. tv I r _ Fuller then 
testified that the divorce plan was never consummatedr (Record 
l 3) .That her· death intervened. 
5 
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(Record 14) 
6 "Q. ~~ov{ ~vas the execution of this deed a part of the divorce 
7 proceedinss that you \\rere negotiating on t' 
12 ~ 1 A~ It ~vas a part of the divorce from the very start. The 
13 B Street property \Vas a s~ft to her· for the divorce, in 
1 4 consideration. o £ the divorce+'' 
0 n Cross-exa.mina t ion Mr. Fuller res tified 1\f r. Moss sent him 
a bill and '\vas paid for the \Vork he did in this case.'~ 
Exhibit I, the deed to the H Street property, was introduced 
in evidence and l\1r. Fuller acknowJedged that it was. his signature. 
(Record 15). 
Mr. Fuller testified~ "I talked to Mr. Moss once." (Record 16). 
Mr. Fu1ler testified that he sav{ the complaint in Mr. Moss' office 
but never received a copy and was never asked to and never did 
sign a \vaiver. (Record 18) _ He then testified) (Record 18) 
18 4 ~Q. Now who v..ras it that telephoned you and to1d you to come 
19 in and sign some papers ? 
20 A~ Oh I don't recall. I believe it was Mr. Moss that talked 
21 to me first~ or it was his secretary, and I know J went down 
22 and l_ooked over the papers and it was all okeh but the amount 
2 3 of the \\' ee k l y money she \Vas to receive and tb at I ~roul dn' t 
24 agree tol so I didn't sign any papers. 
25 Q. Now 1sn~t it a fact that Mrs_ Fuller told you that a deed 
26 had been prepared and that you were going to go down and sign 
27 the deed? 
28. A. I don't remember any such thing as that 
29 Q. Your recollection is that you v.,rere called by ~t r_ Moss~ office? 
30 A. I don't think :so. When I signed the deed I went do\vn 
6 
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{Record 19) 
1 there and we had gotten pretty near together on this money 
2 thing. She finally agreed to go along with me on the thing 
3 because always in the past I had given her the money all I 
·l coulJ give her and she was pretty welJ :>old on the idea.. She 
5 didn't need so much a v,reek any\vay. At that tune when we had 
(l reached the point ~~here she . felt I would take care of her I 
7 went do\vn and signed the deed on this divorce thing and she 
8 never diJ get down to sign the rest of the papers~ but we had 
9 it straightened out. It 'vas that she would be safe in trusting 
10 me to pay this money.'' 
At the time that be signed the deed he did not sec Mr. Moss 
and the only person he talked to was the secretary of Mr. Moss. 
(Record 20) 
-l ~~Q. Do you recall nov.r v.rrhether any docutnents of any- kind w-ert 
S submitted to ~ · o u at the time you signed the deed ? 
6 A. It seems to me that there v;,rerc and I told her that was the 
7 onJy one I v.-~ould sign at the time." 
Mr. Fuller testified that his vtife died September 29, 1958. 
(Record 21) 
1-i ··Q. This property involved here, \\·'ill you describe it to His 
I j Honor so he knows the property that is involved, the property 
1 6 covered by this deed so he knows what it is ? 
17 A. It is a five·unit apartment and four small apartme_nts and 
18 a basement apartment on the north corner of B Street a:Qd 2nd 
19 A venue; a kind of big ye llov~· house that sits back in .all 
~ 0 those trees. ~ ~ 
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29 .. Q. Kov.-· between November 15, 1957) the date the deed \\··as 
30 signed and up untll the time of Fae L~ Fuller's death on 
(Record 22) 
1 S~pter:nber 29~ 1958, to \vhom did the tenants pay the rent? 
2 A~ They alv.rays paid the rent to Mrs. Fuller; always. 
3 Q. You mean from the very beginning? 
4 A~ She collected the rent~ She was a. good bookkeeper a.n d 
5 v.re 1 eft the rent to her from the very start~ 
6 Q. Has she .always done that? 
7 A. She has always collected the rent ... , 
(Record 23) 
10 t .. Q. Did you use the B Street property as ao asset? 
11 A~ Yes. It is used as a.n asset and I listed it 
12 Q. Did you use the B Street property as an asset when you 
13 got the loan? 
14 A. Yes) I used it" 
Exhibits 2, 3, and 4 are letters which 1\fr. Fuller wrote to his 
daughter, l\1rs. Linnea Bentley~ the sole beneficiary of Fae L. fuller's 
WilL (Record 23) 
(Record 25) 
10 ·~Q. Well now didn't you advise your daughter that sbe had 
11 received a val ua bl e piece of property if she handled it 
12 correctly? 
13 A. Well I knt\\' that they werenjt paying their first mort-
14 gage off and that is what they had to do if they took the 
15 property and I outlined that that is what they had to do. 
16 There is no question about that. 
17 Q. And at that time you considered it your property~ did 
8 
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18 you not? . -~· '~ ~ ' . . . 
19 A. Well I probably considered I had been taken for a ride. 
20 I didn~t think there was anything 1 could do about it untll 
~1 I talked to Gordon. I told my daughter at the time it wa.s 
. . 
"?") a terrible tbing to happen and .she said, 'Well, Dad~ it is 
23 your property. I don~t want it~~ At that time I Egured 
24 that in some wa.y she wa.s going to give it to me but at any 
2 5 rate I talked to Gordon and we got in to this deal.~ t 
(Record 26) 
13 ~,Q. Now in whose name was the telephone number at this 
14 apartment house? 
15 A. It was Fae L. Fuller just recently because I had to have 
16 a phone at the other property. It is confusing to have two 
17 phones in the name of Harold Fuller Company and I asked how 
18 to do it and they said you would have to use another phone. 
19 Q. \\'as the phone always in her name? 
20 A. No, it was in both of ours. 
21 Q. Well was she managing the property up at B Street? 
22 A. She always managed the property+ She managed- it from 
2) the day we took it over except that J did the Vlork when I was 
24 home.n 
Mr + Fuller testified that Mrs. Fuller was the p lain~.ti=f 1n the 
divorce action and that Mr. Moss represented Mrs. F ulltr. but 'the 
\\'::tS sort of a go-between to settle this thing~·~ (Record 27) 
(Record 28) 
9 ·~ Q. Well on this divorce proceedings Mr. Moss was acting as 
10 her attorney, wasn't he? 
ll A~ Right.'~ 
9 
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R~direct Examinatio~·: .. 
27 nQ. And you didnjt authorize him~ or anybody elsel to 
28 deliver this deed to Fae L. Fuller until this divorce v.··as 
29 
30 
over7 did you? 
A. I did not, no+~, 
Mr. Fu~Jer testified that in 1959~ he discussed the matter of his 
rights \Vith Mr. Hyde and he had no idea what his rights \verc until 
11r. Hyde told him. (Record 29) 
25 t'Q. And you had considered that you had lost the propertyt 
26 hadn't you? 
27 A. That is the truth. 
28 Q. W'as it ever your intention to give this property away 
2 9 unless the divorce went through ? 
30 A. lt never was.~:> 
(Record 30) 
16 "Q. And did you ever tell her that it was your intention 
1 7 to give this property except on the condition of the divorce 
18 A. No .. ~' 
Re-Cross Examination: 
M r + F u] 1 er testi£ ed that for 15 years he had been endeavoring 
to obtain a divorct and as a result of the death of his wife, he was 
a free man. 
Direct Examination: 
Plaintiff then called as his ~Nitness~ PHYLLIS D. PORTER. 
(Record 31) 
Mrs. Porter testified that during the time negotiations were 
10 
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under\vay between l\1r. and Mrs. Fuller for divorce} she V{as em-
~-. . .. 
ployed by Frank E. Moss as his secretary. (Record 32) 
Exhibits 5 and 6) the original complaint and waiver 1 n the 
divorce action (taken from ML M!_)ss' files by Mrs. Porter), \1lere 
introduced in evidence+ (Record 32) 
That Mrs~ Porter talked to 1\1rs. Fuller at different times during 
the period of the divorce negotiations but no reference was ever 
made to the B Street property. (Record 32) That she did not kno\v 
there \vas any difference between the ~ullers on the amount of 
alimony+ (Record )3) 
(Records 33 and 34) 
30 ·~Q. Did Mr. Moss tell you to preserve this file and t"c) bring 
1 it into Court and to show it to him if he ever asked for it? 
"' i\_ I dontt think he ever expected it to be brought into 
_; Court. I don· t think he expected any actions. It was 
4 ment!oned:r well he simply told me to take the files home and 
5 to keep them in case there was ever any need for them, that 
6 they would be more accessible.n 
Exhibit 8 ~;as offered which were notes made by !VIc Moss. 
The Court refused to admit exhibit 8 as hearsay. (Record 34) 
Exhibit 7, a copy of a letter from Mr. Moss~ fi]es~ was intro-
duced in evidence~ (Record 3 5) 
(Records 35 and 36) 
2) q A_ Well Mrs. Fuller called and said that she was deferring 
2.-i action until Iatert or until the next year so as to give Mr. 
25 Fuller an opportunity to conduct his business 'vith the help 
26 of the property~ 
11 
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27 Q. And do you know whether or not the divorce ·action ~vas 
28 stayed as suggested? 
29 A. She asked that it be held in abeyance until Spring at_ 
30 least. 
1 Q + And nothing further "\v.as done? 
2 A. Nothing further was done~ 
3 · Q~ And then she died? 
4 A. Yes. Everything went along just as it was and she didn't 
5 tell us to make any further move and so things just stayed in 
6 abeyance until her death.t' 
Mr. Afos s sent a bill to Mr. Fulj er on the paper work and the 
time spent in the interview and Mr~ Fuller paid the bilL (Record 
36) 
Cross- f. xamina tion: 
Mrs+ Porter testified that \V hen Mr. Fuller came in to sign the 
deed, she ~vas alone in the office. That she had no conversation 
with himr That he ~·as not shown any of the papers in the file. 
(Record 36) That he did not give any instructions concerning 
what "\Vas to be done with that deed. That the off icc kept two files, 
one marked Divorce Fde and one marked Will File. That the deed 
was placed in the Will File. Mrs. Porter identified her signahl.re 
as the Notary to the de~d. (Record 3 7) 
(Records 37 and 38) 
26 .. Q. So that all that occurred on that occasion was Mr. Fuller 
27 came in and signed the deed? 
28 A. That's right. 
29 Q. And there was practically no conversation? 
30 A. As I reca.ll he said) 'I understand you have a paper here 
12 
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1 for me to sign.) I said, 'Yes,' pulled out the paper and he 
2 signed itt and that was it. 
~ Q. Did you say a paper~ or a deed? . 
4 A. Now that I can't say~ I don't know just what I called it. 
S Q. But nothing further occurred? 
6 A- That's right. 
7 Q. You notarized it and placed it in the file?~ 
8 A_ While he was standing there I notarized it.n 
Re-Direct Examination: 
Pre. trial order corrected subs tl tu tin g the name of Frank E. 
Mos5 for James P. Co"'· ley. (Record 38) 
FORREST W. FULLERJ called as a witness on behalf of the 
plaintiff. 
Dtrect Examination: 
Mr+ Jl'uller testified that he was named as executor in the will 
of Fae L. Fuller and that he is Fae L. Fullerts son. That he declined 
to act as executor by reason of the differences that existed over the 
pr-operty. That his father~ Mr. Fuller~ never asked him to record 
any deed or document+ That he received the \X1ill and De€d from 
~Ir. Cowley in the office of Moss and Cowley. He delivered the 
wjll to Mr. Hyde., who delivered them to Me King. (Record 39) 
(ross~ Examination: 
For rest Fuller testified that h r s mother died September 2 9, 
19 58. At sometime behveen the 7th or lOth of October some week 
or 10 days after his mother died~ he received the d ecd and will and 
4 or 5 days thereafter, he recorded toe deed. That whlle he had the 
deed and will in his passes sion, he did not discuss them with his 
13 
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father. (Record 40) That he distussed the will and the deed with 
his sister, Mrs. Bentley~ after· the funeral. (Record 41) 
Forrest W. Puller \Vas made J ef en dan t ~ s witness and on direct 
examination testified as follows: 
That he is an attorney and represented his father as such. That 
son1e years ago he officed with Gordon Hyde and Moss but never 
~rith Cowley. ~fhat at various times Gordon Hyde represented his 
father. (Record 43) That Mr. Hyd-e represented his father in the 
Ly r it Thea t r c case and he represented his father in a pl urn bing case. 
(Record 44) 
(Records 45 and 46) 
9 · ·Q. Mr. Fuller~ will you describe to His Honor the circum-
10 stances surrounding the recording of the deed?"' 
1 3 .A~. ?~. s l stated~ the deed was given to me with the vv ill. This 
1-1 is the first I knew that the deed had not been recorded and 
15 this is the .first time I sav't' the deed and it v~-·as attached to 
16 the papers I received from Moss & Cow ley and this was some 
I 7 several days after the funeral.~~ 
The only papers he received were the will and the deed~ 
26 · 'Q~ And then what occurred after you received the will and 
27 deed? 
28 A- I was quite undecided as to what to do and I discussed 
29 the matter -~vith Bentley... .. 
8 qA. And finaJiy I decided that it was my duty to record the 
9 deed and did so~n 
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The ·Court sustained an obJection 'of ·plaintiff and· refused ·to 
admit the will in evidence. (Record 47) 
HAROLD C~ FULLER recalled for further re-cross·· examina-
tion+ Mr~ Fuller was shown Exhibit 4 and cross-examined as follows: 
·(Records 49 and 50) 
9 -~Q. ~Now my house is coming along~ but very slo~+, What house 
10 are you referring to? . . 
11 A. 902 2nd South. 
12 Q. ~I almost went under because I needed it as an asset to · 
13 get the loan~ I needed .lt but I got it without it but I 
14 never will know how· ... 
15 A. Thaf s right.·~ 
18 ~~Q. Isn't it a fact you got the loan~ that you got the loan 
19 without using the house? 
20 A. I got the loan without using the ·house the -w· a y I Vtranted 
21 to use it."=-
2 t'A. The only conversation I ever remember was when Linnea 
3 said~ ~Dad~ I don!t want your house/ " 
(Records 51 and 52) 
Re-direct Examination: 
.. 
28 ~~Q. Now you had been told by others., had you not) that 
29 because this deed had been executed prior to her death that 
3-0 you had 1 ost the property ? 
1 A. Thaf s right. 
2 Q. · ·yon consulted tn e to .find out if that was the legal effect, 
3 isn't that trlte? 
4 A. Thafs right. 
5 Q. Until I advised you, you did not know there was any other 
15 
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.6 possibility~ did you ? 
7 A. Thaes right.~' 
PI a in tiff rests. 
Defendant or1-ered as au Exhibit the inventory and appraise-
ment in the estate of Fae L. Fuller. Plaintiff objected and the objec-
tion was sustained. (Record 53) 
FRANK I. MOSS called as a witness for defendant. 
(Records 54 and 55) 
Direct Examination: 
That he is a practicing attorney and a member of the t·tah 
State Bar. That pnor to 1957 he had a partnership with Mt~ Hyde. 
'That the partnership \Vas terminated in August, 195 5. That while 
he VtJ•as in partnership with Mr. Hyde the firm represented Mr. 
Fuller. That he never personally represented Mr. Fuller and in 
19 57, he was ern played by Fae L. Fuller to represent her in a divorce 
action. (Record 54) That as part of the discussion a deed was 
prepared for a certain property and was executed. That he discussed 
the deed \Vi th Mrs~ Fuller on 2 or 3 occasions. That he only disr 
cussed the deed with Mr. Fuller by telephone. (Record 55) 
Voir dire examination by Mr. Hyde. (Record 56) 
11 ~ ~Q. Also I show you Exhibit 7 for the putpos e of refreshing 
12 your memory in connection vlith this matter. 
13 A. Well these tend. to refresh my memory of tbe approximate 
1 -i tr1nc of the conversation) which would be in late 1957; some 
I 5 time prior to November of 1957. 
16 Q. And do you recall what was said in that conversation? 
17 A. In substance the conversation had to do with J\1rs. Fullerls 
16 
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18 actions for a diva rce and a discussion regarding an apartment 
19 house and Mr. Fuller· s statement to me that he ""'as willing as 
20 part of this proceeding that the apartment house . be deeded 
21 over to her, be hers entirely. 
22 Q. And you were not present when the deed was executed? 
2) A. No, I don~t believe I was. I don?t recall it. 
24 Q+ Now after that~ in connection with the deed, did you 
. . 
2 5 ever receive any instructions £rom anyone concernil)g this 
26 deed? 
2 7 A. Well the only instructions I received were from Mrs. 
2 8 F ul ier) that I was to hold all the papers. and everything . 
29 surrounding this case because she had agreed to postpone any 
30 further action until her husband had made some financial 
(Record 57) 
1 arrangements) other financial ar:r~ngements." 
. . 
Continue Direct Examination by Mr. King. 
2 qQ. Now were you at any time acting as agent for Mr. Fuller?n 
7 ~·A. I didn~t ever act at Mr. Fuller's instructions or ever 
8 consider that I rep resented him at all. I received a 11 of my 
9 instructions from Mrs. Fuller.~, ; . 
Cross-examination: 
Mr. Moss tetsified he talked with Mr. Fuller one .time about 
domestic problems. It is possible that Mr. Fuller had stated to him 
··at various times he had asked Mrs. Fuller for .a divorce.'' 
27 ~~Q. And in order to obtain this he was willing to give it to 
28 her} this property j as a divorce settl em en t ~ isn't th.a t 
29 essentially what he told you? 
30 A. Well he did say that he was going to) willing to convey 
17 
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:,.., 
(Record 58 
l t h c p t operty to her; that it b asicaU y should be hers because 
2 of her need for income. 
3 Q. In th2 divorce settlement? 
4 A. Well I didn't understand it ,~·as to be for the divorce 
5 settlement/' 
The complaint \\Tas executed the 13th day of November, 195 7, 
and the deed \\·as signed the l )th day of November., 1957. In the 
cornplaint there Vilas a prayer for the property~ That Mrs. Fuller 
called and s2id she wanted to dcJay the divorce (Record 58) and 
she asked Mr. Moss to keep everything in the .file until the following 
year \" ... hen she would get in touch with him. 
~1r. Moss did not reca 11 that Mr. Fuller was represented in 
the proceedings. That he didn't ever talk v.,rith an attorney r That 
it v.ras his understanding that Mr. Fuller was urging the action more 
than lvf rs. F u 11 er \v hen she came to him a.n~ asked him to represent 
her. She sai? that her husband had urged her to come . to him. 
That Mr. ~foss had kno,vn 1\-fr. Fuller and that his son, Forrest., 
had officed v.rith 1\.1r+ Hyde and Me Moss. That the firm had repre-
sented l\1r. Puller and that Mr. Hyde divided the fees v.:ith Mr. Moss. 
That Mr. Moss at the reguest of Mrs. Fuller had sent a bill for 
$35.00 and it was paid. (Record 59) 
l\1 r. l\{os s testified that it \Vas customary in divorce cases to 
collect fees from defendants and he was successful in doing so. 
Mr. Mass tes tifi. ed that he never represented Mr. Fuller · after 
August of 195 5. (Record 60) 
Mr. i\:t os s te:s ti fi ed that if there had been a coptest in tbe divorce 
18 
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he might have 4 ·considered longer because I had known ~fr. Fuller 
before and he had been represented by the firm. Yes. I understood 
that there 'vasn"t .any conflict with them about getting the divorce. 
There \\·ere conflicts that led up to that decision/~ That the drawing 
of the papers vla s mere 1 y a mechan .lea 1 matter to effect their joint 
intent. (Record 61) 
In response to a question by the Court, lvfr. Moss testified 
that the deed 'vas made in his office by his stenographer under his 
direction 
(Record 61) 
29 ·~THE COURT: There ~Tas one statement you made here 
30 just prior to the time you looked at this complaint and the 
(Record 62) 
1 deed. 1 believe it \vas something to the effect that the deed 
2 \Vas not given as a settlement in this divorce. What is your 
3 statement about that now~ after having read the complaint 
4 \v herein there is a prayer for D.~e apartment house and some 
S reference made to it ? Do you \va nt that statement to stand 
6 ~:t or - -
11 4 ~A. As I can re<.:all it now~ and it is not carefully clear to 
12 my mindl that when she came to me asking about the divorce 
13 she told me that they had discussed the property and that she 
14 was to have the apartment house and then we discussed about 
1) that would permit her to get enough income from the apartment 
16 house so that it wouldn~t be necessary for him to pay alimony 
1 7 after a period of time \V hen the income rentals \vould be ab 1 e 
18 to support her and on the basis of that disrussion I advised~ 
19 I think the advice came from me that the title to the apart-
19 
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20 ment house should be in her name so that she would have a 
21 right to receive the income from it, and as a result of that 
22 the deed was drawn. And I think that is the time when I 
23 had the phone conversation which resulted in Mr. Fuller's 
24 coming to the office and executing the deed~ 
25 THE COL:RT: Well~ is it your understanding from 
26 your conversation v .. ·ith these persons that this deed was 
2 7 executed as a part of this divorce proceeding and settlement 
2 8 of her property rights in that divorce ? 
29 A~ \\'/ell the t~vo coincided~ JudgeJ and I am sure that tbls 
30 deed grew out of this \V hole conversation. How ever~ 1 under-
(Record 63) 
1 stand that he had executed the deed and given it to her for 
2 the property~ 
3 THE COURT: For what reason? 
4 A. Preparatory to the divorce. 
5 'THE COl.IRT: I see. 
6 MR. HYD.F.: And in consideration of her agreement 
7 to divorce him, is n t t that true ? 
8 A. At least in part, yes.~' 
12 t~MR. KING: Mr~ Moss, the purpose of this deed was 
13 to turn over the apartment house over to her so she would 
14 have an immediate income was it not? 
15 MR. HYDE: Now just a minute. I object to this as 
16 leading. This is counsel's witness. 
17 THE COURT: Oht I think he has already ansv.:ered 
18 your question, Mr. King. He has just now told us 'vhy the deed 
19 was given so that she would have an income in the future at 
20 least. 
21 l\.1R. KING: Well that is the very point~ Your HonoL 
20 
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2.2. When 'vas this to provide her v..7 ith an income? 
23 MR. HYDE: Now I submit that that issue is one for 
2 4 the Court to determine .. , 
(Record 64) 
6 .. A. Well I didn~t ever have a discussion \vhen both of them 
-· \"Vtre present, but in my discussion with Mrs. Fuller she - -
S MR. HYDE: Just a _moment, Your Honor. I'm going to 
9 object to that as hearsay: 
10 THE COURT~ The objection \Vill be overruled: 
11 A. She explained that she was living in an apartment, one of 
12 the apartments in the building and \vas receiving son1e income 
13 at that time from rental being paid by others.~, 
2i 14 MR. KIKG: 'tWhy wasn't the deed recorded? 
28 A. T"he deed \vas not recorded because Mrs. Fuller called me 
29 and said, 4 Hold everything in abeyance+ Hold all of the 
30 papers~ because of money problems I have agreed to let this 
(Record 65) 
1 go over to next summer,' and 1 t had something to do with the 
2 Joan that \VJ.S already in existence on the building.n 
STATEMENT OF APPELLANT'S POINTS 
I. 
It is the position of the defendant and appellant that there 
·was a good and vaJ id delivery o £ the deed to the B Street property T 
This i~ based upon the facts which demonstrate his Il\~~fEJ:'\T at the 
TIME of the DELIVERY of the DEED to transfer title to his wife in 
order to provide her~ Fae L. Fuller~ with a permanent income and 
21 
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as a part of temporary alimony pending the divorce. His acts and 
statements indicate this until the' pdint when, under the a~vice 
of h.is attorney~ h c changed his position but then it 'Ar as too late 
as a matter of law~ 
IL 
That the Findings of Fact and Cone Lu.sion.s of Law made and 
entered by the Court are not supported by the evidence and that 
the Court .sho u I d have sign cd the Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of I~aw and Judgment submitted by the defendant as. they:_ are 
su ppqrted by the evidence. The Court should have sustained de-
£ end ant's () b j ections to plain tiff~ s Fin dings of Fact~ Concl uslons 
of La"W~ and Judgment 
III. 
That a ne\v trial should have been granted anJ defendant 
afforded an opportunity to introduce ne\vly discovered evidence 
"vhich v,.~as material and supported the position of defendant, ·which 
evidence \vas not discovered until after the trial. Though defend ant 
exercised diligence, he was unable to locate the witnesses prior 
to the triaL 
IV. 
The Court erred in sus ta 1 n 1n g an objection to the a dmi5s ion 
of the F ae L. Fuller \'i./ llL 
v. 
1~he Court erred in sustaining an objection to the admission 
of the Inventory in the Fae L. Fuller estate. 
22 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
IT IS THE POSITION OF THE DEFENDANT AND AP-
PELLANT THAT THERE WAS A GOOD AND VALID DE~ 
LIVERY OF THE DEED TO THE B STREET PROPERTY~ THIS 
IS BASED l:PON THE FACTS WHICH DEMONSTRATE HIS 
11\TENT AT THE TIME OF THE DELIVERY OF THE DEED 
TO TRANSFER TIT'LE TO HIS \\1 fFE IN ORDER TO PROVIDE 
H.ER~ FAE L. FULLER, WITH A PERMANENT INCOME AND 
AS A PAR'T OF TEMPORARY ALIMONY PENDING THE 
DIVORCE. H lS ACTS AND STATEMENTS INDICATE THIS 
UNTIL l'HE POINT \X!HEN~ UNDER THE ADVICE OF HIS 
ATTORNEY. HE CHANGED HIS POSITION BUT 1-HEf\: IT 
WAS TOO LATE AS A i\IATTER OF LAW. 
This case had a simple and ordinary beginning. For 1 S years 
( RecT 30) plaintiff had wanted a divorce and finalJy his v.rife con-
cluded to give him a divorce and consulted an attorney~ Frank Moss. 
They di.scussed the problem and a complaint and waiver were pre-
pare-d. Neither was ever executed or filed. The parties~ hov.rever, 
separated and plaintiff executed a deed on November 15, 19 57, to 
one of their tv.ro apartment houses, to-v.rrit the one at lOS B Street. 
The De fen dan t and Appellant's position is that the deed v.,· as de-
livered and possession was given to the property unconditionally 
to provide Mrs. Fuller ~v.ith an income. jy(rs. ruller died September 
29, 1958~ after willing the property to her daughter. Plaintiff and 
Respondent, after consulting an attorney, filed this action in 
ear 1 y 19 59, con tending he dell vered the deed conditionally and 
that the delivery ~ras contingent on his wife's .securing a divorce. 
Mr. Fuller is the only one who testified as to any such contin-
23 
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gent and conditional delivery of the deed .. Plaintill~s testimony 
then comes too Ia te and is self-serving, im rna terial, inc om peten t 
and irrelevant on the i~sue of what his intent was at the time he 
signed and delivered the deed and 1 eft it in the hands of l\1 rs. 
Fuller's attorney. (Rec. 18-19) The legal question is quite simple. 
What \Vas Mr. .Full c r~.) intention when he signed and left the deed 
in a third party's hands? (Rec. 19) We can only determine Plain-
tiff~Respondenfs intention from his own actions and statements 
prior to his change of heart and prior to his change of posi ticn. 
(Rec. 25) His actions and attitude in relation to the deed and 
property are shown by the fol! owing: 
1. His wife had the phone at the B Street apartment house 
changed into her name after Mr. Ful 1 er deeded the property to 
her. (Recr 26) 
2. Fac L. Fulicr managed the property on B Street and col-
lected the rents, paid the bills) and made payments on the mortgage 
but she did not in any way have anything to do 'vith collection 
of rents or take any part in the management of the property on 
Second South Street. After Mr. Fuller deeded the property he ex-
erc•sed no control over it. 
3. All instructions to Mr. Moss came from Mrs. Fulter (Rec. 
56) and he repre5ented her and not Mr. Fuller. If tbe deed was 
given contingent on a divorce~ why was it given before the matter 
'vent to Court? Mr. Moss gives us the answers to tbe question of 
his em plo ym en t and the reason the deed was given before the 
divorce+ 
(Record 56) 
4 ~2. 1 Q. 1'\ ... ow \vere you at any time acting as agent for ML 
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3 Fuller?' 
7 ·A. I didn't ever act at Mr~ Fullert.s instructions 
8 or ever consider that I represented him at all. I 
9 receiveJ all of my instructions from Mrs+ FuHer.' 
Cross.examination: (Records 57 and 58) 
27 'Q. And in order to obtain this he w.as 'villing to 
28 give it to hert this property~ as a divorce settle-
29 ment, isntt that essentially \\-·hat he told you?' 
30 ~A. Well he did 5ay that he was going to~ willing to 
1 convey the pro per ty to her; that it basically should 
2 be hers because of her need for income. 
-~ Q. In the divorce settlement? 
4 A. Well I didn't understand it was to be for the 
5 divorce sett lem en t: " 
The Court tried to settle the question and questioned 1-lr. Moss 
as follows: 
(Records 61 and ~2) 
•
4 29 'THE COURT: There \Va5 one statement you made here 
30 just prior to the time you looked at this camp laint and the 
1 deed. I believe it was something to the effect that the deed 
2 was not given as a settlement in this divorce. What is your 
statement about that novv~ after having read the complaint 
4 wherein there is a prayer for the apartment house and some 
5 reference made to it? Do you want that statement to stand 
6 or--
11 ~A. As I can recall it now, and it is not carefully clear to 
12 my mind~ that when she came to me asking about the divorce 
13 she told me that they had discussed the property a.nd that she 
2) 
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14 \vas to have the apartment house and then we discussed about 
15 that~rould pcnnit her to get enough income from the apartment 
16 house so that it Vtrouldn't be necessary for him to pay alimony 
17 after a period of time when the income rentals would be able 
18 to support her and on the basis of that discussion I advised, 
19 l think the advice came from me that the title to the apart-
20 ment house should be in her name so that she Vi-Tould have a 
21 right to receive the income from it, and as a result of that 
22 the deed was drawn~ And I think tha. t is. the time 'vhen I 
23 had the phone conversation which resulted in Mr. Fuller's 
24 coming to the office and executing the deed. 
25 THE COUR1~: Well, is it your understanding from 
2 6 your conversation v.rri th these persons that this deed v.,ras 
27 execu~ed as a part of this divorce proceeding and settlement of 
2 8 her property rights ln that divorce? 
29 Well the tu.To coincidedt Judge~ and I am sure that this 
30 deed drew out of the whole conversation. However, I under~ 
(Record 63) 
l stand that he had exelU ted the deed and given it to her for 
2 the property~ 
3 THE COURT: For Vlhat reason? 
4 A. Preparatory to the divorce~ 
5 THF. COURT: I see. 
6 lviR. HY'DE: And in consideration of her agreement 
7 to divorce himl isn~t that true? 
8 A. At least in part, yts.' 
12 4MR. KING: Mr. Moss) the purpose of this deed was 
13 to turn over the apartment house over to her so she would 
14 have an itnmediate income, was it not? 
26 
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l ~ MR. HYDE: Now just a mluute. I object to this as 
16 leading~ This is counsel's witness. 
17 THE COURT: Oh, I think he has already ans,vered 
18 your question, Me King. He ha~ just now told us why tbe deed 
19 was given so that she would have an income in the future at 
20 least. 
21 MR. KING: Well that is the very point, Your Honor. 
22 When wa.s this to provide her \vlth an income? 
23 MR. HYDE: Now 1 submit that that issue is one for 
2-~ the Court to determine.' 
(Record 64) 
6 'A. Well I didn~t ever have a discussion ~":hen both of them 
7 V{ere present) but in my discussion \Vith Mrs. Fuller she - -
8 MR. HYDE: Just a moment, Your Honor. I'm going to 
9 object to that as hearsay. 




A. She explained tha. t she \Vas 1i ving ln an apartment, one of 
the apartments in the building and \vas rec.:eivlng some income 
at that time frorn renta] being paid by others.~ ~~ 
4. After the death of Mrs. Fuller) the conduct of 1-[c Fuller 
showed clearly that he did not consider the property his but that 
of his daughter. He wrote her as follows: 
Exhibit 2 
''I DON~T wANT TO \WRITE A LETTER-BuT r FEEL 
I SHOULD give you one or two facts. 
I~THIS HOUSE COULD BE WORTH MOKEY ONLY IF SOJ\:'IE 
ONE \\/ILL KEEP rfHE BILLS PAID AND KEEP THE PROP-
ERTY IN GOOD CANDITlt)r\_ 
27 
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2-YOU CO[;LD HAVE IT ALL PAID OFF IN LESS THAN 
TEN YEARS Al\~D THE LAND AND HOUSE SHOULD BE 
WORTH ABOUT 35 TO 40 THOUSAND DOLLARS+ 
3-YOU WILL NOT BA ABLE TO TAKE ANYTHJ~~G OL~T 
OF IT. ANY SOONER THAN TEN YEARS UNLESS YOU SELL 
11·- AND BECAUSE OF THE LARGE PAYMENTS EACH 
MONTH IT IS HARD TO SELL. 
4-YOU MAY E\7E!< HAVE TO PUT MONEY INTO IT EACH 
~IONTH AS I HAVE HAD TO DO TO GET IT PAID FOR.~~ 
Exhibit 3 
·~Inclosed arc papers that shoul J go to your a ttorny as the 
Waterl Gas and Lights and so on must be paid.'' 
... The Gas & Lights are differnt if they turn these off your people 
\vill all move out and that is what can happen. 
·~ Betr:er get a check to the gas co. 
Dad't 
In exhibit 4 Plaintiff gives his daughter an accounting on the 
apartment house and states, '"I have 5tayed in the apt at 105 b and 
have keep the \valks cleaned and did some work on the apts as it 
was needed. I do not have my place ready as yet a.nd as soon as I do 
I will get out-Sooner if any one wants me to_" 
·~1 DONT KNOW HOW TO TELL YOU ANY PLANER 
TO PAY THE BILLS ON TIME, OR SELL IT OUT FOR KOTH-
ING BUT DONT MESS UP A DEAL THAT YOUR MOTHER 
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The conduct of Mr. Fuller~ after signing and leaving the deed 
at the attorney's office and until he sa\v his attorney~ clearly indi-
cates that he considered the deed deJivered and bindingT This evi-
dence obviously shows that his intent \vas to make a valid uncon-
di tiona! del j very of the deed. His subs eq u en t change of fi1:in d can 
not alter or change what is an accomplished fact. In support of 
this proposition \\"t' submit the folloV~t·ing authorities: 
Gappmayer v. Wilkenson, 53 LTtah 236, 177 P 763, quoting 
from pp. 765 and 766. 
u ( 1-3) It has been determined by this court that nwhere 
a grantor delivers a deed to a third person, absolutely as 
his deed, without reservati on) and without intending to 
reserve any control over the instrument~ though it is not to 
be delivered to the gran tee until the grantor~ s death, the 
deed, when de livered, is valid and takes effect from the first 
delivery"; also that i( after such delivery, the deeds are 
repossessed by the grantor or destroyed~ the grantor does 
not thereby revest himself \Vith title. Wilson v. Wilson, 32 
Utah, 176~ 177, 89 Pac. 643.~' 
"It is t.rue that the subsequent acts of the defendant 
Nelson arc not cons is tent \Vi th this construction, but it is 
apparent that that \vas the intent of the parties at that time, 
and any act or transaction afterwards v/a5 a subsequent 
thought. As determined by this court in the case of WHson 
v. \X1ilson) sepral the rights of the plaintiffs became fixed 
by the acts of the parties at this date, and the defendant 
L\r e I son could not revest himself of any interest or ti tie in 
the property~ by his subsequent actsTn 
Wilson vT Wilson~ 32 Utah 169, 89 P 643, quoting from pp. 
(545-646. 
··After the deeds had been u neon di tion ally delivered to 
Peter, they passed beyond the dominion and control of the 
grantors. After that Peter could have taken them home l 
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deposited them in the bank box, or, for that matter, he could 
even have placed them in his father's private desk. \X!hen 
an absolute delivery had been made, the fact that Peter 
there aft c-r p 1 aced the deeds in th ~ bank box to which the 
deceased had access) and in which the firm papers Vt~"ere kept, 
gave the grantor no authority to recall the deeds or to control 
t ll e ir custody. If under such circumstances the deceased had 
taken the deed~, or if he even had destroyed them] he wouJd 
not th er eb y have reves ted himself "V-1 i th ti tie~ The ch aractcr 
of the delivery is not affected by the fact that the deeds 
after delivery Vt~"e rc pI a~ed where the grantor eq u.all y v.:i th 
grantee had access to them. Le Saulnier v. Loew~ 53 Wis_ 
207~ 10 N. \X.!. 145; Rogers v. Rogers, 53 Wis. 36] 10 N. \\/_ 
2~ 40 Am. Rep. 756; Reed v. Smith, 125 CaL 491, 58 Pac. 
139.1 ' 
The California case of Lavely v. N onemaker, 298 P 97 t\ gives 
an exce 11 ent s ta tetn en t of the 1 a w in reJ a tion to conditional deli very 
and the dangers in such transactions~ quoting from page 9 78. 
n ( 4~ 5) The circumstances. of the case at bar a.re not 
~ t.ith as to take it out of the general rule~ Neither the deed 
nor the n.ss e rted oral .agreement either expressly or impliedly 
refers to the defendant's promise to care for the plaintiff 
as a condition affecting the validity of the deed~ and the 
trial court has not found that it is such a condition. Tnte, such 
p ro1n i.se constituted th c sole and on t y consideration for the 
transfer, but in t-his particular the situation is not unlike that 
where a conveyance is 1nade solely in reliance upon the 
gran tee~ s v..r r i tten promise to pay an agreed purchase price~ 
or to subs eq u en tl y render certain legal services t the breach 
of each of \vhich promises it has been held gives r1se on1y 
to an arbon for damages. Lav..~rence v. Gayetty~ supra~ Hart-
lnan v. Reed, 50 Cal. 485. The case of Schott v. Schott, 168 
Cal. 342, 345. )4t\ 143 P. 595, presented a state of facts 
somewhat similar to those involved in this case. It is therein 
declared, in substance, that where the grantor accepts the 
verbal promise of the grantee for support \\·ithout anv 
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a.~reement or understanding that the failure to do the acts 
as promised should be a condition, or in any way affect the 
validity of the dccJ.. or entitle him to a reconveyance~ in 
the ab.sencc of fraud, the grantor has no right to rescind 
or to have the deed set aside~ but his only remedy for breach 
of the gr2.ntee's personal convenant is an action for dam-
ages. The fol]owing appearing in James v. James~ 80 CalT 
App. 185, 197, 215 P. 666~ 671~ is pertinent: 'In the case 
at bar j there "\vas no condition expressed in the instrument~ 
and in lawl it was not delivered conditionally. There was 
at best only an oral promise on the part of the grantee of 
something to be done by her at a subsequent time. * * * 
Hence~ if an instrument is delivered to the grantee as the 
present dzed of the grantor it becomes freed from any con~ 
clition not expressed in the deed itsel( and operates by 
vesting title immediately without any reference to the per-
fa rmancc of the conditions~ although such result rna y be 
contrary to the express stipulation w the parties. Apart 
from the e 1 em en tary ru 1 e interdicting the mod ifi cation or 
varying of the vital terms of a writing by parol, any attempt 
to restrict or enlarge the scope or effect of an instrument 
transferring real property by an oral stipulation is pro-
hibited by the statute of £ raudsr Hence, whether a deed~ 
'VI.· hen delivered~ sha 11 take effect absolute 1 y, or upon the 
performance of some c.:ondition not expressed therein~ c:annot 
be determined by parol evidence. Any condition qualifying 
the delivery must be inserted in the deed itself., or else the 
deed must not be delivered to the grantee.~ ~~ 
HConJitions subsquent are not favored, for they tend to 
destroy estates. White v. Hendley, 3 5 CaL App. 267, 2 71 ~ 
169 P~ 710. While defendanfs promise ro care for her 
father was the sole and only consideration for the conveyance 
to her, we cannot say on the record now before us that the 
faithful perf or rna nee of such promise is or ~Tas intended 
by the parties to be a condition subsequent, upon the breach 
of which there should he .a failure of defendant's title_ On 
the contrary~ such prorni se constituted but a persona 1 cove-
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nant~ the breach of v,rhich gives rise only to a cause of action 
for damages. To hold that a vendor of real property could! 
for a failure to pay the purchase money or other considera-
tion, repudiate his deed and recover the land] would render 
rea i e.s tate titles dangerou( ir uncertain J and would resuJ t 
in th c tnos t serious consequences~ Law renee v. Ga yetty., 
'' supra. 
Norby v. Pisterj 250 P 2nd 633, a California case~ quoting 
f fOlll P· 634. 
'! ( 1 r 3) The grant deed from de£ end ants to plaintiff 
covering the property involved was unconditional, unaffected 
by £ ra ud in its inception~ conveyed title, and is not subject 
to rescission on account of a failure of consideration. Borden 
Y. Boyvin~ 55 Cal. App. 2d 432, 436~ 130 Pr 2d 718; Abel 
v. O'Hearn., 97 Cal. ~PP· 2d 747~ 758, 218 P.2d 827; 
\Xriltiams v. Reich, 123 ·Cal. App. 128~ 131., 10 P. 2d 1030. 
As was said in Lavely v~ Nonemakerl 212 Cal. 380, 383, 
298 p~ 976~ 977: ,., 
The case then quotes the portion of Lavely v. N onemaker as 
quoted above. 
Quoting further from Norby v~ Fister~ 
'~ ( 4) \Vhere ~ as here, the installation of the pipe lines 
was not made a condition of transfer of title, plaintifFs 
remedy, if any, \Vas an action for damages for breach of 
contract. Johnson v. Clark~ 7 Cal. 2d 529, 533~ 61 P2d 767." 
In re Hume's Estate~ 272 P. 2d 999, quoting from p. 1002, this 
is a l\.1 on tan a case which quotes C~] .S. 
'~ (7~9) As a general rule, a delivery of a deed must be 
absolute anJ unconditlonal., unless it is in escroVJt'. Further 
as appears in the ( 30) C.J.S. title Escrows pp 7, also 21 
C.J., p. 873 note 96 p~ 878 note 31, a delivery in escrow 
rna y be made only to a third person not a party to the trans-
a.c ti on, and there can be no such delivery to the gran tee 
upon a condition not ex pressed in the ins trum en t. Accord· 
ingly, \\'h~ie tbere is some authority to the contrary, it is 
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generally held that the delivery to the grantee of a deed 
absolute on its face wjll pa~ complete title to him regardless 
of any condition or contingency on which its operative effect 
is made to depend * * * .n 
1 n the case at bar, the position of plain tiff is that the deli very 
of the deed is based upon the promise of the wife that she \\'Ould 
obtain a divorce. 1 did not .find a case based u pan a promise to obtain 
a divorcel but there is a California case based upon a promise to 
marry. This case is Williams v. Reich:t 10 P.2J 1030~ quoting from 
pages 1031 and 1032. 
t~It ha.s been repeatedly held that, in the absence of fraud, 
a conveyance of real ~~tate} fully executed on the part of 
the grantor, cannot be set aside for a fa i Jure of consideration 
on the sole ground that the promises and agreements, not 
amounting to conditions subsequent, \vhich induced its 
execution, and v.:rhi(h by the terms of the contract under 
which the deed is made were not to be performed until after 
its execution, have not been performed. La\vrence v. Gay· 
etty~ 78 CaL 126) 20 P. 3R2~ 12 Am. St. Rep. 29; Schott v. 
~chott~ 168 CaL 342., 143 P. 595, 597; Duck~vorth v. Watson-
ville Water~ etc., Co.~ 170 Cal. 425, 150 PT 58; Tillaux v. 
Tillaux, 115 Cal. 663, 47 P. 691; Tisdale v. Bryant, 3R 
Cal. App. 750, 177 P. 510; "White v. Hendley, 35 CaL App. 
267") 169 p. 710. t~ 
n (2) Nor can the promise to 1narry respondent he con-
sidered as a condition subst;q uen t. The record does not 
show, nor is it foundl that there was any agreement by 
appellant to reconvey if she did not marry respondent.The 
deed of conveyance appears to have been absolute and un-
conditionalT 
~·As stated in Schott v. Schott, supra: · ··The plain tiff saw 
proper to accept the verbal promise of the defendants to 
do certain things withnut any agreement or understanding 
that the failure to do the .acts as promised should be a con· 
dition or in any way affect the validity of the deed, or 
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entitle him to a reconveyance.~:> t) nder such circumsta.nces, in 
the absence of fraud, act:ual or constructive, defendant v.r·ould 
have no right to rescind," or to have the deed set aside.' " 
On the question of evidence showing intent~ we refer you to 
64 L;tah 2GO, 228 P. 911. quoting from Mower v. Mower, page 914. 
"Since delivery is cssentialJy a matter of intent:t which 
intent is to be a r r1 v cd at from all the facts and surrounding 
circumstances~ we believe the better rule is to th"clude in 
those facts an J c ircu1n stances declarations of the gran tor 
both before and after the date of the deed~ at least \vhere 
it appears that the d ecJ ar a tiot 1s are made fair 1 y and in the 
ordinary course of life, and not in apparent anticipation of 
con trove rs y or l i ti ga tio n with r e£ erence to the matter dis-
cussedj and in the absence of any evidence of bad faith, 
fraud~ or misrepresentation.'~ 
!vi ower v. Mower is quoted and followed in Reed v. Knudson~ 
.80 l!. 1128, IS P. 2d 347 and in Lnsee v. Jonesl 120 U. 385, 235 P2d 
132~ and Staniey v. Stanleyj 97 U. 520~ 94 P.2d 465. 
POINT 11~ 
THAT THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND COKCLL;SIONS 
OF LA~.r MADE AND ENTERED BY THE COURT ARE NOT 
SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE AND THAT THE COURT 
SHOLfLD HA \'E SIGNED THE FINDINGS OF FACT, CON-
CLLTSIONS OF LA \V AI'\rD JUDGMENT SUBMITTED BY THE 
DEFE:t\1DANT AS THEY ARE SUPPORTED BY THE EVI-
DENCE. THE COURT SHOULD HAVE SUSTAINED DEFEND-
ANT'S OBJECTIONS TO PLAINTIFf'S FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LA \\r AND JUDG~lEKT. 
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Defendant and Appellant ti.led objections to the Findings of 
r act and Cone lusions of La'"- and J u d gm en t pro posed by P 1 aio tiff-
Respondent and this document is in the record at pages 81 to 87. 
To avoid unduly prolonging the length of this brief) Appellant 
respectfully requests the Court to examine and read this document 
and the matters pointed out therein and consider it as a part of 
the entire issue. \\/.itbout repeating the testimony furnished the 
trial Judge in the objections~ \\re point out only the legal effe.ct and 
the errors in brief. 
Paragraph I of the Findings tho ugh pointed out at the trial 
and perhaps unimportant the defendant is not the Executor but is 
the A dminis tra tor. 
Paragraph li-The Court fio ds ~"LIn the latter part of October) 
19 57~ the deceased agreed to a divorce on condition that as part 
of the J i vorcc settJ ement she be granted the real property." There 
was some testimony to this effect by Plaintiff, but his tes timon y -,.vas 
self-serving and came as a change in position a£ ter consulting his 
a ttorneyT and is contrary to the testimony of M r~ Mo5Sl which was: 
(Rec. 57~58) 
41 27 'Q. And in order to obtain this he was willing to give 
2 8 it to her~ this property, as a di vo rc e s ettl em en t~ 
29 isn't that es sentia 11 y what he· told you ? 
30 A~ \X'elJ he did say that he \vas going to, willing 
1 to convey the property to her; that it basically 
2 should be hers because of her need for income. 
3 Q. In the divorce settlement? 
4 A. We!J I didn~t understand it was to be for a 
5 divorce sett!emen t. ~ ~ ~ 
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Paragraph III of the Findings 1s contrary to .all evidence. 
Paragraph IV of the Findings is drawn from thin air. There 
is no such evidence in r he record. Sure 1 y there should be a breath 
of evidence to support a finding. We call your attention to the 
testimony of Mrs. Porter, secretary to Mr. Moss, in this connection 
as set out in th~ objections. (Rec. 84~85) .(Rec. 33, 36, 37) in the 
transcript. 
Parag~a ph V of the Fin dings is not based on the evidence. The 
Erst sentence is imma te!ia 1 and h.as no relationship to the issues and 
is not 5 up ported by the evidence+ The last sentence thereof ls a 
cone I u si on of la ~·. It is the position of the def en dan t that the 
execution and delivery of the deed and the Jeaving of the deed in 
the off ice of JVI r. Mos_s constituted a valid deli very of the deed to 
Mrs. Fuller. That upoo the death of Mrs. Fuller the deed and the 
\}/ill Vt7ere delivered to Forrest W+ Fuller. (Rec. 45) This evidence 
aJ so s hov{s that For rest W. Fuller, the son of Mr + and Mrs. Fuller, 
and a lawyer considered that the deed had been validly delivered 
to Mrs. Fuller through her agent~ Mr. Moss, or he would not have 
been justified in recording the deed. 
Paragraphs VI, VII, and VIII are not supported by the evidence 
as set out above and argued in this brief. Mr. Moss was not an 
agent of 11r. Fuller but according to his testimony (Rec. 57, Line 7) 
he acted only for Mrs. Fuller and there \\·'as no escrow. 
Based upon the lav.l as cited above and the evidence the District 
Judge should have signed the Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law and Judgment of the Defendant and not those of Plaintiff. 
The purpose of filing Objections to Findings is to afford the Judge 
an opportunity to correct aoy errors and erroneous impressions 
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formed during the trial. In this case the Judge even had the tran· 
script to check but no doubt £ e 1 t it was not o ec essary as no co erections 
were m.ade. The fjndings were signed as submitted~ 
POINT III 
THAT A NEW TRIAL SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED 
/\:\JD DEFENDANT AFFORDED AN OPPOR'TUNITY TO IN-
TRODUCE NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE WHICH WAS 
MATERIAL AND Sl7PPORTED THE POSITION OF DEFEND~ 
ANT, WHICH EVIDENCE WAS NOT DISCOVERED UNTIL 
AFTER THE TRIAL. THOUGH DEFENDANT EXERCISED 
DILIGENCE, HE WAS UNABLE TO LOCATE THE WIT-
NESSES PRIOR TO THE TRIAL+ 
In support of defendant's motion for a new trial, an affidavit 
was filed. (Rec. 91) This new evidence would have shown that on 
1:\ovember 15, 1957t the deed was given to Mrs. Fuller. That on 
Marcb 3., 1958, the mortgage on the B Street property was increased 
and the money received in excess of $4~000 was loaned to the son~ 
Forrest W. Fuller~ and he made a note to his mother, not to his 
father~ for the amount loaned. This is further evidence that Mr. 
and Mrs. Fuller consideled the property to be hers and she Vi-Tas 
entitled to all income and proceeds from any trans action in reJ at ion 
' 
to the property. 
Had the information cone erning this loan been known prior 
to the trial it could have been used in the examination of Mr. Fuller 
as ,,·ell as the son and thus additional evidence might have been 
obtained to enlighten the Court on the issue of intent in delivering 
the deed. This evidence further supports the testimony of Mr. Moss~ 
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Mr. Fuller testified at the trial, (Rec. 26) 
~·Question by Mr. King: ~welL \V~ she managing the 
property up at ~~ B' · Street? 
1\. She always managed the property. She managed it 
from the day ~vc took it over except that I did the ,~.or k 
v.-~hcn L was home.' n 
. 
After the trial and the testimony of Mr. FuJler, defendant \vas able 
to locate v.,r i tness es · to contradict this stat em en t and had they been 
permitted to te5 ti fy at a u e\\r tria 1, would have testified that prior 
to 1957 they paid rent to Mr. FulJer but after 1957 and the giving 
of the JeeJ:1 they paid th~ir rent to Mrs. Fuller. This evidence was 
material and important to show how Mr. and Mrs. Fuller considered 
and treated the property after the giving of the deeq._ The defendant 
should have beet~ given an opportunity to intn~duce this evidence. 
The matter was tried vl i thout a jury and it would have been a simp I e 
matter to permit a partial new trial £or this purpose~ 
In the motion for a New Trial counsel for defendant also 
as shown by the affidavit ( R~. 92) argued the Court should have 
admitted in evidence the Will of Fae L. Fuller and the Inventory 
of her estate. These t\\'O points are also set out in AppeJlanfs points 
No. IV and V and will be hereafter argued. 
•I 
POINTS IV ·AND V 
THE COURT ERRED l T\ SUSTAINING AN OBJECTION 
TO THE ADMISSION OF TilE FAE L. FULLER WILL. 
THE COL:R T ERRED iN SUS1'i\JKING AN OBJECTION 
TO Tf-IE ADMISSION OF THE f[\.;"\7ENTORY IN THE FAE 
L. FL'LLER ESTATE. 
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As points IV and V involve the same princjples and go to the 
same point of law t!J.ey will be argued together. ·Record 46 Court 
refused to admit the-rFae L. Fuller Will in evidence. Record 53 the 
Court refused to admit the Inventory in evidence. The purpose of 
requesting that the Will and Inventory be received in evidence ~as 
to sho'v hov.·· Fae L. F~ller understood the transaction. The Will 
and Inventory would have shown that 'VI-rithout the property in 
qu.est[on there was no purpose in making a will. 
In the case of Johnson vs. Cameron, Supreme Court of North 
Carolina, 48 SE 640, on p.age 641) ~vc find this statement: 
~'The Court erred also in rejecting evidence that the 
grantor by his will~ disposed of this land, it being competent 
as tending to throw light upon the nature of his possession 
of the deeds and of the land_r~ 
\\'e feel the Court erred in refusing to admit the Will and Inventory. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the law and the evidence the Defendant-Appellant 
fee 1 s that the Court should reverse the trial Court and direct the 
trial Court to sign the Findings~ Conclusions of La '-V and J ud gm en t 
submitted by defendant 
Respectfully submitted~ 
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KARL V. KING 
Attorney for Defendant 
and Appellant 
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